State of Utah v. Darin Richardson : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah v. Darin Richardson : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ryan D. Tenney; Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General's Office; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Jennifer K. Gowans; Randall K. Spencer; Fillmore Spencer; LLC; Attorneys for Defendant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Richardson, No. 20070747 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/472
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARIN RICHARDSON, 
Defendant. 
CASENO.20070747-CA 
APPELLANT IS NOT 
INCARCERATED 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
ORDER FOR COMMITMENT, IN THE THmD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON PRESDDING. 
Ryan D. Tenney (9866) 
Mark Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South 
6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 Jennifer K. Gowans (7538) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Darin Richardson 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
UTAH M 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARIN RICHARDSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 20070747-CA 
APPELLANT IS NOT 
INCARCERATED 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
ORDER FOR COMMITMENT, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON PRESIDING. 
Ryan D. Tenney (9866) 
Mark Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South 
6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
Jennifer K. Gowans (7538) 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
Fillmore Spencer, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Darin Richardson 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER MR. RICHARDSON'S CLAIMS 
UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE AND RULE 22(e) 2 
II. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT MR. RICHARDSON ADMITTED HE 
WAS IN BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT IS INCORRECT 7 
CONCLUSION 8 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) 8 
Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) 4 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) 5 
State v. Beck, 2007 UT 60 3 
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) 2 
State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) 4 
State v. Wanosik, 31 P.3d 615 (Utah App. 2001), affd, 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003). 2 
United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) 4, 5 
Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1989)... 6 
Rules 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 1-3, 6, 8 
Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment 4 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 4 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARIN RICHARDSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 20070747-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's argument that Mr. Richardson's claims are not preserved is 
without merit. The errors raised by Mr. Richardson resulted in his sentence being 
imposed in an unlawful manner. Therefore, they may be considered for the first 
time on appeal under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Further, the errors were plain. 
The State's contention that Mr, Richardson admitted breaching the plea 
agreement is unfounded. Mr. Richardson's claims demonstrating that it was 
impossible or impracticable for him to perform under the plea agreement are 
defenses to, not admissions of breach. Therefore, the State is not excused in its 
failure to recommend at sentencing that Mr. Richardson not be incarcerated. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER MR. RICHARDSON'S 
CLAIMS UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE AND RULE 
22(e). 
The State argues that Mr. Richardson's claims involving errors that 
occurred at the time of sentencing and that directly affected the sentence imposed 
should be dismissed because they were not preserved below. BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
("Br. Appe.") at 7-10, This argument is without merit. The State does not address 
the applicable rule and preservation issues implicated by the fact that the errors 
Mr. Richardson details in his opening brief occurred at the time of sentencing 
when the district court issued its final order in this case, while concurrently and 
immediately ordering Mr. Richardson into custody and precluding his attempts to 
say anything further or to talk to his attorney. R122:13. 
Rule 22 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "The court 
may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time." This rule permits an appellate court to review errors that occur at the time 
of sentencing for the first time on appeal. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1995). The appellate court's ability under Rule 22 (e) to consider sentencing 
errors for the first time on appeal eliminates the need to establish plain error. State 
v. Wanosik, 31 P.3d 615 (Utah App. 2001), ajfd, 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003). 
Mr. Richardson's sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the 
district court found him in breach of the plea agreement based on the State's 
unilateral representations and without a hearing. See, Br. Appt, 7-13. Based on 
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its finding of breach that disregarded Mr. Richardson's defenses and only relied 
upon the prosecution's unilateral representations, the district court declined to 
follow the plea agreement's recommendation for no jail time and sentenced Mr. 
Richardson to 180 days in jail with credit for 51 days served. R122:l 1-13. 
Mr. Richardson's liberty was taken away without affording him an 
adequate opportunity to present evidence of his compliance with the plea 
agreement in his own defense. In other words and as he argues in his opening 
brief, at the sentencing hearing Mr. Richardson was deprived of his liberty without 
due process of law such that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e). Because Rule 22(e) applies, the State's argument that Mr. 
Richardson's claims are not preserved has no merit and this Court should consider 
his claims brought for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, Mr. Richardson argues in his opening brief that "the district 
court's failure to G afford him the chance to defend himself was plain error." 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt.") at 13. A plain error is one that occurred, is 
harmful and should have been obvious to the trial court. State v. Beck, 2007 UT 
60, f 10. An error is harmful if "absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id. 
As he argues in his opening brief, it was a violation of Mr. Richardson's 
right to due process of law and thus error for the trial court to make a finding of 
breach based on the State's unilateral representations. Br. Appt. at 7-9. This error 
should have been obvious to the trial court. Tne due process clauses of both the 
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state and federal constitutions provide that no person may be deprived of liberty 
without due process of law. United States Constitution, Fifth Amend.; Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7. It is also established under Utah law that plea 
agreements "are binding on the parties and the court once the plea is entered and 
accepted." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). 
Because the issue of material breach is a question of fact, whether the 
proceeding is civil or criminal both parties must be afforded an adequate 
opportunity to present evidence on the question. See, Br. Appt. at 13. Breach 
cannot be determined upon the unilateral representations of one party. Due 
process requires that a defendant be afforded the right to a hearing including the 
right to present evidence before a finding of breach can be made, particularly in a 
criminal case where a defendant's personal liberty is at stake. See, Foote v. Board 
of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (holding that inmates have a right to due 
process at Board of Pardons hearings). 
The State incorrectly asserts Mr. Richardson "does not cite to a single case 
interpreting the right [to have an evidentiary hearing to determine breach of the 
plea agreement]." Br. Appe. at 16. However, Mr. Richardson quotes at length 
from the 10th Circuit's opinion in United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 
1390 (10th Cir. 1981) wherein the court specifically holds that a defendant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a plea agreement has been 
breached because "[tjhe question of a defendant's breach is not an issue to be 
finally determined unilaterally by the government." Id. at 1390 (Br. Appt. at 10). 
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Mr. Richardson also cites Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), which 
Calabrese relies upon, wherein the Supreme Court's holding centers around the 
important due process rights involved in the context of plea agreements and 
requires "safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due under the 
circumstances." Id. at 262 (Br. Appt. at 10). 
This legal precedent can hardly be described as a failure to "cite to a single 
case" in support of Mr. Richardson's claim that due process requires an 
evidentiary hearing on the question before breach of the plea agreement can be 
found. Santobello was decided more than thirty years ago and Calabrese more 
than twenty. That due process principles apply in the context of plea agreements 
is not new or obscure law but is well-settled. Thus, it should have been obvious to 
the trial court that due process requires giving Mr. Richardson an adequate 
opportunity to present evidence in his own defense before a determination of 
breach can be made. 
Further, the trial court's error is harmful to Mr. Richardson in that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had he been given the 
opportunity to present evidence in his own defense. Mr. Richardson explained to 
the trial court how he lost a business client because his sentencing was continued 
the first time, which reduced his income and made him unable to make full 
payments, although he had continued to make monthly payments. R122:, 7-8,11. 
The fact that Mr. Richardson was current in his obligations when the sentencing 
was first scheduled corroborates this claim. Rl22:2-6, 10-11. 
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Mr. Richardson's ability to pay was also adversely affected by his prior 
incarceration but he represented he had made monthly payments subsequent to his 
arraignment totaling $2,560. R122:6, 10. Mr. Richardson claimed he had made 
diligent efforts and had done everything he could have been expected to do; he 
also indicated he was developing his business and had an opportunity to take 
additional clients and thereby raise his income substantially. R122:6-7, 9. Mr. 
Richardson also explained that he had experienced serious medical problems just 
prior to sentencing in August 2007. R122:9. Mr. Richardson was seeking to 
procure health insurance both for himself and for his children. R122:9. 
Had Mr. Richardson been afforded the opportunity to present evidence 
supporting his claims, there is a reasonable likelihood he would have been excused 
from full performance under the plea agreement on the basis that his frill 
performance was impossible or highly impracticable. Western Properties v. 
Southern Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App. 1989). Thus it was plain 
and harmful error for the trial court to make a finding of breach and consequently 
incarcerate Mr. Richardson without affording him due process of law. 
The State's argument that Mr. Richardson's claims are not preserved lack 
merit because the district court's errors occurred at the time of sentencing and 
resulted in Mr. Richardson being sentenced without due process of law and in an 
unlawful manner. Therefore, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows this Court to consider his claims for the first time on appeal. Further, the 
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district court committed plain error when it found Mr. Richardson in breach of the 
plea agreement. 
II. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT MR. RICHARDSON ADMITTED 
HE WAS IN BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT IS 
INCORRECT 
The State argues the prosecution was excused from its obligation to 
recommend no jail time because Mr. Richardson admitted he had breached the 
plea agreement. Br. Appe. at 10-14. This factual representation is incorrect and 
not supported by the record wherein Mr. Richardson asserted he was unable to 
fully perform but never admitted to breaching the plea agreement. R122. In fact, 
the word "breach" cannot be found in any of Mr. Richardson's representations. Id. 
As detailed both in the previous section and in Mr. Richardson's opening 
brief, he claimed he was unable to meet his payment obligations between May 11, 
2007 (when he was current), and his sentencing in August 2007. The State 
acknowledges Mr. Richardson was in compliance with the plea agreement on May 
11, 2007 when he was supposed to be sentenced. Br. Appe. at 11. Hie apparent 
fact that Adult Probation and Parole did not timely provide the district court with 
the presentence investigation report is not Mr. Richardson's fault. R134; Br. 
Appe. at 13.l 
1
 Mr, Richardson's counsel did not have the transcript from the hearing on May 11, 
2007 when the opening brief was prepared but relied instead on the minute entry 
that suggests the presentence investigation report was not completed at that time. 
In any event, Mr. Richardson was prejudiced by the delay because he was current 
in his payment obligations on May 11, 2007. R99-100;R122:2-6, 10-11; R134. 
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The State liberally and incorrectly construes Mr. Richardson's explanations 
for why he was unable to meet his obligations between May and August 2007 as 
an admission that he was in breach of the plea agreement. However, explaining 
that one is unable to perform one's contractual obligations is a defense that 
excuses performance, not an admission of breach. See, Allen v. Prudential 
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 815 (Utah 1992) (explaining 
impossibility or impracticability excuse contract performance). 
The State is simply making the same error the district court made when it 
refused to accept Mr. Richardson's claims of impossibility or impracticability as 
valid defenses to breach. The State's argument that these defenses are not 
preserved because they were not explicitly mentioned during the sentencing 
hearing (Br. Appe. at 14) is defeated under Rule 22(e). Further, the fact that Mr. 
Richardson and his counsel argued at length that his performance was impossible 
or impracticable, without using those precise terms, further defeats the State's 
argument. See, R122:6-ll. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Richardson agrees with the State's observation that if he prevails on the 
issues raised in this appeal, the appropriate remedy is to remand this matter to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of breach. In the event the 
evidence demonstrates Mr. Richardson's performance was excused by the 
Thus the State would have presumably recommended no incarceration pursuant to 
the plea agreement. 
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doctrines of impossibility or impracticability, the State's failure to comply with the 
plea agreement should be construed as a material breach and Mr. Richardson 
should be permitted to withdraw his plea. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of August, 2008. 
A 
/ 
Jenifer K^Gowans 
Attorney for Mr. Richardson 
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